Panelists Take on Intermodal Competition in FSF Conference Transcript

The edited transcript of the FSF Fifth Annual Conference panel on "The Right Regulatory Approaches to Wireless and Wireline Broadband Providers" is now available online.

Discussion in this panel touched on such subjects as the place of the U.S. in international broadband rankings, the IP transition, universal service reform, and the role of state regulators in the broadband era. 

Not to be overlooked are the insights offered by then-Commissioner Robert McDowell regarding wireless and intermodal competition:

If I think back to 10 years ago, exactly right now, I was in the throes of the debate over the unbundled network element platform, "UNE-P," as we called it. That was all about trying to bring residential voice competition to wireline services. The best and the brightest on both sides of that debate did not foresee – did not foresee – the rise of cable telephony or the rise of wireless as a substitute.

That whole concept of wireless substitution was laughed at. It was said: "The quality of wireless isn't any good. Or calls get dropped. And there's not enough build-up in residential areas, not good enough reception. People are never going to substitute – never going to substitute – wireline for wireless or have wireless as a substitute for wireline."  
Now, more than a third of all U.S. households are 30 wireless-only. That's evidenced by a lot of what's pointed out in AT&T's petition. But 10 years ago, nobody saw the rise in rise in wireless competition happening. If you're patient as a regulator, or as a member of Congress, the markets will find a work-around. 

...Consumers are telling us that wireless broadband is a substitute – not in every case, not for every market. But it is a substitute. The fastest growing segment of the broadband market is wireless, with the vast majority of consumers having a choice of at least four wireless broadband providers. And that number will increase as we see the build-out of LTE continue. If LTE continues to spike it will be game changing, as we will get broadband in the car and things like that. We don't know what's coming over the horizon. And the last thing we want is the government to preempt or nip in the bud the innovation coming over the horizon. 

In my Perspectives from FSF Scholars paper, "Convergent Market Calls for Serious Intermodal Competition Assessments," I urged the FCC to look more closely to the effects of wireless substitution and cross-platform competition. An informed regulatory policy demands no less. To be sure, the FCC has opportunity to include a more detailed assessment of intermodal competition in its next Wireless Competition Report. And it should do so.

House-Approved SEC Regulatory Reforms Are Worth Repeating

On May 17, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 1062. This legislation was the subject of my blog post, "For Independent Agencies, SEC Regulatory Accountability Bill is an Act to Follow." Congratulations are in order for those who supported it.

But don't expect H.R. 1062 to be readily greeted in the U.S. Senate. Last week the White House issued a "Statement of Administration Policy" in opposition to the bill's final passage.

The SEC Regulatory Accountability Act may not make it into law this time around. Still, the legislators who sponsored the bill should be thanked for taking regulatory reform ideas seriously. Legislators should likewise be encouraged to continue pursuing regulatory reforms of this kind. H.R. 1062's cost-benefit analysis and look-back review provisions make the bill a model of reform for all independent agencies. 

A La Carte, Agian

Suppose I wish to purchase only the Sports page of the Washington Post on an a la carte basis on the theory that it ought to be priced less than the whole newspaper? 

Or suppose that I wish to purchase only the interview in Playboy (or centerfold if you prefer) on the theory that it ought to be priced less than the whole magazine. 

No one thinks the government should – or could – mandate that newspapers or magazines be made available on an a la carte basis just because some politician or policymaker thinks that some consumers might prefer to "pick-and-choose" only their favorite sections. 

Yet, in the past, politicians and policymakers have suggested the government should require cable operators to make available the channels on their systems on an a la carte, pick-and-choose basis. 

This was a bad idea when Senator John McCain and others offered it previously over a decade ago. 

It is a worse one now. But Sen. McCain is back at it again, with his newly introduced "Television Consumer Freedom Act" (S. 912). In his May 9^th floor remarks introducing his bill, Sen. McCain said it "is about giving consumers more choices when watching television." 

My gosh! In the history of humankind, consumers never have had so many choices for watching so much diverse video programming offered by so many video providers. 

Whatever the situation over a decade ago when Sen. McCain first urged adoption of an a la carte requirement, it is indisputable that the video programming and distribution marketplace is now competitive. Curiously, despite what should be its obvious relevance to consideration of new regulatory requirements, Sen. McCain does not discuss the current competitive marketplace environment in his floor remarks. 

In the context of this blog, it is impossible and unnecessary to chronicle the remarkable increase in consumer choice in the video marketplace that has occurred over the past decade. For a general picture with lots of data points, I refer the reader to the FCC's Video Programming Competition Report (Fourteenth Report), released in July 2012, even though this report covers marketplace developments only through 2010.

In the Fourteenth Report's very first paragraph, the FCC states that "the most significant trends since the last report relate to the increased deployment of digital technology, consumers’ rising demands for access to video programming anywhere and anytime, and the evolution of online video from a niche service into a thriving industry." Remember, this is as of the end of 2010.     

Today's cable systems typically offer subscribers approximately 900 unique channels, and the two competing satellite operators (Dish Network and DIRECTV) offer nearly the same number of channels. And now, of course, the "telephone companies" compete in the multichannel video market with similar video offerings. Presently, the cable companies have approximately 58% of the multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) market, the satellite providers 33%, and the telephone companies 9%. 

But as the FCC observed, even as of 2010, the emergence of "over-the-top" online video as a "thriving industry" further altered the marketplace environment in the direction of more consumer choice. Today, Netflix, with 29 million subscribers, is the nation's largest subscription video service, with more subscribers than Comcast (22 million). In addition to the dominant provider Netflix, other major online video programming purveyors include Hulu, Amazon, iTunes, HBOGo, and Apple TV. Not to mention YouTube, which recently announced initiation of a subscription video service. And, of course, in addition to the traditional "television" screen, you can watch all this various video programming on laptops, notebooks, and smartphones. 

We truly do live in the age of "TV Anytime, Everywhere." 

While Sen. McCain did not focus on these competitive developments, it would be difficult to conclude a marketplace failure exists warranting further government regulation of video program providers. In his May 14^th statement at the Senate Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet hearing, Sen. McCain summed up this way: "Consumers should not have to pay for television channels they do not watch and have no interest in watching." It is true that the cable and satellite operators do not presently allow consumers to purchase channels on an individual basis, but there are an increasing number of online providers that already offer just such "on demand" business models. 

And the most fundamental point is this: In light of the existing competition among video programming purveyors, it is much more likely that the marketplace will satisfy consumer demand in the most efficient, least costly manner than some government-directed offering. While the idea that all consumers should be able to purchase only the channels they choose to watch from all MVPDs may have superficial appeal, the notion that such a universal a la carte regime really would benefit consumers is highly suspect. 

Numerous previous studies have shown that a government-mandated a la carte regime would not necessarily lower prices for consumers and might well diminish, even substantially, the number of channels available, especially those appealing to minority or specialized tastes. This is only logical. With the unbundling of all channels, the costs for making available certain individual channels would rise as the audience size for particular channels is reduced. Some channels almost certainly never would get off the ground because, absent the opportunity to bundle them with already-popular channels, MVPDs would not risk incurring the costs of carrying a channel with little initial expected audience demand. 

In a 2003 study, "Issues Related to Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry," the GAO concluded that, under an a la carte regime, cable networks could lose advertising revenue, and, as a result, "some subscribers' bills might decline but others might increase." 

And in their 2008 Perspectives from FSF Scholars, "Bundles of Joy: The Efficiency and Ubiquity of Bundles in New Technology Markets," Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis explained at length why product bundling generally is efficient and ubiquitous throughout the economy. With respect to cable operators, at the time subject to pressure by then-FCC Chairman Kevin Martin to adopt an a la carte model, Professors Liebowitz and Margolis had this to say: "Customers may naïvely believe that the single channel price will be their bundle price divided by the number of channels in the bundle. Regulators may cynically give them pay-by-stations options. But since customers will be unhappy with the likely result, some regulatory alternative will be found, but no alternative is likely to enhance efficiency." 

Again, today's video distribution and programming marketplace is more competitive than ever and, thus, almost certainly responsive to evolving consumer demands. It is foolish to think the government can do a better job of deciding how video programming should be offered than the marketplace. 

I should say that I understand that, strictly speaking, Sen. McCain's bill does not impose a government mandate requiring MVPDs to adopt an a la carte model. Rather, the bill would withhold from MVPDs and broadcasters certain regulatory "benefits" absent adoption of an a la carte model. It is in this sense that Sen. McCain says that his bill is "voluntary." 

Without engaging in a linguistic debate concerning the definition of "voluntary" in the context of a regime in which the government confers and then threatens to withhold certain benefits absent agreement to adopt a government-preferred course of action, I will grant Sen. McCain this: Due to the remarkable changes in the video marketplace that I have already discussed, it is time to begin examining, on a comprehensive basis, jettisoning many of the outdated legacy regulatory requirements he has identified, such as the network non-duplication, syndicated exclusivity, must-carry and retransmission consent, compulsory copyright, and so forth. 

But the existence of such a tangle of legacy requirements in a fast-changing, competitive marketplace should not be a justification for adopting still more government intervention. Rather, I would respectfully urge Sen. McCain to consider it a reason for reducing and eliminating outdated regulations so the free marketplace can be allowed to work. 

One final note: Recall my (hypothetical) desire to purchase only the Washington Post Sports page or the Playboy interview (or centerfold). I said at the outset that no one believes the government should – or could – mandate that the Post or Playboy be required to satisfy my desire. Apart from any others, a reason for this is that the First Amendment would prevent such government intervention with respect to the exercise of the publishers' editorial discretion regarding the way they wish to assemble their content into a package. I argued way back in May 2007 in "The Constitution, A La Carte" that any government requirement that has the effect of imposing an a la carte regime on cable operators and other MVPDs likewise should be found to violate their First Amendment rights because it would infringe upon their editorial discretion to package their program content as they wish. 

I said then that "a la carte constitutionalism simply won't do." I still believe that to be true, of course, and I hope you do as well.

For Independent Agencies, SEC Regulatory Accountability Bill is an Act to Follow

Everyone needs a reality checks sometimes, even "the experts." When so-called expert independent agencies consider regulating areas of our economy, shouldn't they check to make sure new regulations won't cause more economic harm than good? Isn't it worth double-checking the results once new regulations are in place?

For independent agencies, cost-benefit analysis should provide that reality check. And post-adoption "look back" assessments should serve as a double check. This is the basic approach of the SEC Regulatory Accountability Act (H.R. 1062). It's an economic-minded reform bill scheduled for consideration soon on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives.

H.R. 1062 offers a constructive model for regulatory reform for other independent agencies – like the FCC. Provisions of the SEC Regulatory Accountability Act could form the foundation of a future "FCC Regulatory Accountability Act."

Absent market failure, regulation typically reduces economic efficiency and technological innovation. Regulation reduces the freedom of market participants to rely on their informational insights and skills to pursue new technological and service strategies to meet consumer demand. Freedom and knowledge is replaced by prescriptive government rules. Those come with compliance costs and are more likely to preserve the status quo. And regulatory costs to providers routinely reach consumers in the form of higher prices.

Where regulation is suggested to remedy a perceived problem, cost-benefit analysis can help identify those situations where regulation is justifiable. This means an economically grounded assessment by the assigned government agency. Such an assessment can improve the likelihood that proposed regulations might outweigh the negative consequences often attached to government controls on markets.

Requiring a government agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior to imposing regulation offers a check on bureaucracy. It is an informative procedure that can help stave off harmful overregulation.

The SEC Regulatory Accountability Act (H.R. 1062) would reform Securities and Exchange Commission processes for assessing, adopting, and reviewing rules. Among the legislation's provisions, two features stand out.

H.R. 1062's first standout feature is its requirements for agency cost-benefit analysis. Before issuing a regulation under the securities law, the SEC would be required to:

[U]tilize the Chief Economist to assess the costs and benefits, both qualitative and quantitative, of the intended regulation and propose or adopt a regulation only on a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the costs of the regulation.

Also, "[i]n deciding whether and how to regulate," the SEC must assess costs and benefits of alternative approaches, "including the alternative of not regulating." The SEC must pick the approach that "maximizes net benefits."

H.R. 1062 lists components of such cost-benefit analyses. Those include whether the rulemaking: (i) "will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation"; (ii) " is tailored to impose the least burden on society, including market participants, individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other entities"; and (iii) "is inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative of other Federal regulations."

H.R. 1062's second standout feature is its post-adoption impact requirements regarding "major rules." The SEC would have to track the consequences of new regulations likely to have an annual economic impact over $100 million or which result in "a major increase in costs or prices" for consumers or industries. When adopting major rules, H.R. 1062 would require the SEC to set out post-implementation metrics to measure their economic impact. 

Those metrics would form the technical basis of a required SEC "assessment plan" regarding major rules. The assessment plan would have to consider "the costs, benefits, and intended and unintended consequences of the regulation." That plan sets the groundwork for an assessment report, submitted by the SEC's Chief Economist within two years of the major rule's adoption. Within 180 days of an assessment report's publication, the SEC would be required to propose amending or rescinding the major rule, or to publish a notice stating no action will be taken.

In short, H.R. 1062 reform proposals are commendable and worthy of the U.S. House's full consideration.

And Congress should consider applying the SEC Accountability Act's cost-benefit analysis and post-adoption assessment requirements to other independent agencies. Both of H.R. 1062's standout features are suitable for application to the FCC and for inclusion in FCC reform legislation.

As observed earlier, the FCC is not required to attempt cost-benefit analyses before it imposes expansive regulations. For example, the FCC's decision to impose network neutrality regulation on broadband Internet access services was criticized on this count. The FCC lacked any cost-benefit basis for its sweeping regulatory intrusions. Its Open Internet Order was further criticized for dismissing any need to demonstrate existing or likely anticompetitive conduct or consumer harm before imposing regulations.

More recent FCC notices, such as its proposed rulemaking regarding spectrum aggregation, invited interested parties to explain likely costs and benefits of different agency actions.

But asking marketplace competitors to offer the assessments the agency should consider is not a serious accountability measure. And the FCC is vigorously defending its legal authority to impose net neutrality regulations without any cost-benefit analysis in the D.C. Circuit.

For that matter, the FCC has no empirically-based process for measuring and examining the results of its new regulatory undertakings. The FCC's two primary tools for removing outdated regulations – Section 10 forbearance authority and Section 11 biennial review authority – have been largely neglected by the agency.

In many instances, H.R. 1062's language could be lifted directly from the bill and made applicable to the FCC context. Other bill provisions would need only minor recalibration.

An "FCC Accountability Act" would help ensure proposed regulations are justifiable. And it would serve as a check against agency overregulation. Requiring the FCC to undertake cost-benefit analyses prior to adopting rules and to measure results post-adoption is sound policy. It makes economic sense too.

ESPN, Net Neutrality, and Helping Consumers

The Wall Street Journal ran a story late last week to the effect that ESPN might be considering some form of arrangement with a broadband wireless provider to compensate the wireless carrier if the carrier's subscribers accessing ESPN’s website exceed certain data plan limits. In effect, ESPN would be paying the carrier a fee of some sort so consumers would not avoid visiting ESPN’s website for fear of incurring additional data usage charges. 

Predictably, Public Knowledge and other “consumer” interest groups raised alarms, such as in this piece: “FCC: This Is What a Net Neutrality Violation Looks Like.” Just as predictably, these alarms are exaggerated. And they are misguided. 

Not surprisingly, the alarms, as the lawyers say, “sounded” in net neutrality. I say “sounded” in net neutrality because, when read closely, the Public Knowledge piece does not actually claim the hypothesized ESPN-wireless carrier arrangement would constitute a violation of the FCC’s rules. 

This is wise because the FCC’s net neutrality order specifically exempts wireless providers from the neutrality mandates except in ways not relevant here. So, the Public Knowledge piece more aptly might have been titled, “This Is What a Net Neutrality Violation Might Look Like If the Net Neutrality Rules Actually Applied to Wireless Providers.” Rather awkward for a title, I admit, but more accurate. 

In its net neutrality order, the FCC declared that it would not apply the prohibition against discrimination to wireless because “[m]obile broadband is an earlier-stage platform than fixed broadband, and it is rapidly evolving.” According to the Commission, “t]he mobile ecosystem is experiencing very rapid innovation and change, including an expanding array of smartphones, aircard modems, and other devices that enable Internet access; the emergence and rapid growth of dedicated-purpose mobile devices like e-readers; the development of mobile application ('app') stores and hundreds of thousands of mobile apps; and the evolution of new business models for mobile broadband providers, including usage-based pricing.” And the agency referred to operational constraints that typically differ from those that fixed broadband providers encounter.

The FCC certainly had good reasons, including those enunciated above, not to apply its net neutrality restrictions to mobile broadband providers. So, in one sense, I am tempted to say, “end of story” or “no story.”

But in another sense this is too easy and misses the broader, more fundamental point. Too easy because I have no doubt that Public Knowledge, Free Press, and other pro-net neutrality advocates will continue arguing that the arrangement that ESPN supposedly is considering, or similar-type arrangements, ought to be banned by net neutrality rules, even if they currently are not. These pro-regulatory net neutrality advocates will continue to urge the FCC to adopt more stringent anti-discrimination prohibitions, and to interpret the existing ones in the most restrictive manner.

If the Internet service provider were not wireless but wireline, the anti-discrimination prohibition that Public Knowledge might claim to be violated is the supposed restriction against the ISP charging a content provider a fee for some form of priority treatment. In paragraph 76 of its net neutrality order, the Commission explained that what it called “pay-for-priority services” potentially are problematical because they might disfavor edge providers which may not be able to pay, or want to pay, for priority treatment.

Read paragraph 76 the Commission’s order (and most of the rest of the order as well) and observe the conjectural nature of the possible harms the agency seeks to guard against by questioning “pay-for-priority” services. Moreover, as far as I can tell, the Commission’s order or its regulations don’t actually prohibit all “pay-for-priority” arrangements. Rather, the Commission simply says that such arrangements “would raise significant cause for concern.”

My own "significant cause for concern" regarding the consumer groups’ reaction to the ESPN story runs like this. First, as already established, the net neutrality regulations don’t apply (in respects relevant here) to wireless carriers. But that doesn’t stop the net neutrality advocates from raising alarm bells “sounding” in net neutrality-like claims.

Second, there is no indication that in this instance, based on what we know, that by considering paying a wireless carrier some amount to compensate for a subscriber’s overage charges that ESPN will receive, or expects to receive, any kind of priority treatment. There is no indication that a wireless carrier’s subscribers will receive faster, or otherwise preferential access, than others accessing the web.

Of course, it is certainly likely that with ESPN agreeing to pay for the excess usage charges that consumers will be more inclined, rather than less, to continue visiting the ESPN site. This is exactly what ESPN wants, and it is not unlike merchants who provide toll-free 800 numbers to encourage consumers to call their businesses.

Finally, and most fundamentally, were the Commission ever to change its rules, or interpret its existing regulations, to definitively prohibit the type of two-sided compensation arrangement that ESPN reportedly is exploring, this likely would prove, especially over time, a distinctly anti-consumer move in both the wireline and wireless spheres. Despite any protestations to the contrary, this is because the FCC will be presuming it possesses the knowledge to allocate payments for recovery of investment in scarce network capacity resources more efficiently than the private providers which made the investments with their own capital. In doing so, it is likely that all consumers, not just those heavy users that wish to stream two ballgames or two movies a day, will be forced to pay higher charges than otherwise would be the case.

In the dynamic, still evolving Internet environment, the FCC doesn’t possess such superior knowledge concerning the most efficient allocation of scarce network resources and methods of recovering invested capital. Rather, the Internet service providers, along with the content and applications providers that may wish to enter into voluntarily negotiated compensation arrangements, surely must be attuned to – and responsive to – evolving consumer demand and needs. Otherwise, of course, in an economic sense, their networks, websites, and applications will be underutilized. And consumers will be required to pay more than they otherwise would to compensate for such underutilization.

So, in its professed concern for “edge providers” – of which ESPN is an example – the FCC’s supposed (possible) prohibition against content provider compensation likely harms all consumers.

A final note: In exempting wireless providers from the general nondiscrimination mandate in its net neutrality rules, as noted above, the Commission referred to “an early stage platform” that “is rapidly evolving” and is “experiencing very rapid innovation and change.” This is true, of course. But it is also true of the entire Internet ecosystem, including the wireline segment. It is somewhat of a conceit for the agency not to acknowledge this.

In my view, until a court invalidates the FCC’s net neutrality regulations, or Congress or the FCC repeals them, they will be a continuing source of regulatory uncertainty and potentially costly mischief. Almost any new innovative business arrangement likely will be met with claims of violation "sounding" in net neutrality. Unfortunately, those who suggest otherwise are almost certainly deluding themselves.

In the meantime, perhaps the best that can be hoped for, short of repeal, is for the Commission to summon the wisdom to interpret the regulatory restrictions sufficiently narrowly so that the agency does not unduly stifle new investment and innovation.

Putting IP into Constitutional Perspective

On May 10, FSF President Randolph May and I published our Perspectives from FSF Scholars paper, "The Constitutional Foundations of Intellectual Property." Our paper briefly explores the constitutional principles behind copyright and patent. Both are expressly recognized in Aricle I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.

As we explain in our paper, a Lockean-Madisonian formulation of government's purpose and of property rights grounds intellectual IP (IP) in natural right, adjusted to a social context for the public good. This Lockean-Madisonian approach bolsters the property rights status of IP in the face of recent criticisms levelled against copyright and patent systems.
 
Understanding IP constitutional underpinnings is a necessary first step in constructing an informed policymaking approach to the rules for copyright and patent. And it's all the more important as IP becomes more and more important to fostering innovation in our digital-age information economy.
 

Tom Wheeler, Historian at the FCC's Helm

Tom Wheeler, PresidentObama's nominee to be the next FCC Chairman, has lots of experience in thecommunications policy arena. Some have suggested his long ago leadership ofNCTA (the trade association for cable companies) and of CTIA (the tradeassociation for wireless companies) somehow should be disqualifying on thetheory he has been a "lobbyist." In my view, however, the knowledge hegained in these positions ought to be a plus. 

And Mr. Wheeler'smore recent experience investing in communications, Internet, and high-tech companieswith Core Capital Partnersshould be useful as well. 

But whatintrigues me more, at least today, about Mr. Wheeler is his avocation as ahistorian, and a serious one at that. 

Yes, a historian,with a particular interest in Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War. It is possiblethat Mr. Wheeler's appreciation for history's sweep could be as helpful to thenew FCC Chairman as his experience in the communications policy field. 

In the followingsense, I mean. 

Tom Wheeler'sbook, Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails: How Abraham LincolnUsed the Telegraph to Win the Civil War, was published in 2006. MichaelBeschloss, one of my favorite historians, had this to say about the book:"Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails is afascinating, succinct, and original history of how a great President usedcutting-edge technology to save his country." 

Telegrams as a"cutting edge technology?" In 1844, Samuel F.B. Morse sent the firsttelegram in the U.S. from Washington to Baltimore, exclaiming: "What hathGod wrought?" It was a fitting exclamation for the so-called cutting-edgetechnology of the day. 

And, as we learnfrom Tom Wheeler's interesting book, the telegraph – now surely a historicalrelic – was key to preserving the Union. In contrast, in Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails, Mr. Wheeler relates in the very firstparagraph how he realized the Iraq war was the first "war by e-mail." 

From T-Mails to Gmails,not to mention to Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and all the myriad data, voiceand video services that comprise what today we call the "Internetecosystem." The difference between the days of the telegraph and thetelephone, and Western Union and Ma Bell – entities that possessed monopolisticpower in their heyday – and today's multi-platform and multi-screen broadband Internetenvironment is akin to the difference between carrier pigeons and rocket ships. 

What mightSamuel Morse exclaim now if only he could behold "cable" operators,"telephone" companies, wireless and mobile carriers, online Internet videopurveyors, fiber optic providers like Google and GigU, satellite operators, andothers, all competing against one another in an attempt to meet rapidlyevolving consumer demand for high-speed broadband services.  

I suspect ahistorian like Tom Wheeler, more than most of us, will appreciate the import ofthe dramatic technological and marketplace change from T-Mails to Gmails. Andperhaps a historian, especially one with telecom policy experience, will appreciatethat, in light of these remarkable marketplace changes, our nation's communicationspolicies should reflect today's competitive digital realities, rather than therealities of last century's monopolistic environment. 

At least I hopeMr. Wheeler will bring such appreciation to the job of leading the FCC. 

In his SecondMessage to Congress in 1862, President Lincoln uttered these immortalwords: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion.As our case is new, we must think anew, and we act anew." 

I do not wish fora moment to be misunderstood as equating the challenges that President Lincolnconfronted with those confronting Tom Wheeler when he becomes Chairman of theFCC. Of course they are not. 

But it does not seemout of place to suggest that Mr. Wheeler, a Lincoln scholar and someone who hasobserved closely the dramatic changes in the increasingly competitivecommunications marketplace, may well draw inspiration from Mr. Lincoln'sinjunction to jettison past dogmas, and to think anew, and to act anew. 

Certainly theFCC could benefit from ridding itself of outdated regulatory dogmas developedin a bygone monopolistic era, and from thinking and acting anew.