The proposed merger between CenturyLink
and Level 3 Communications, if approved by regulators, would likely enhance
competition in the market for enterprise broadband services – with no effect on
residential broadband services. The FCC is in the midst of conducting its review
of the merger. At the same time, states in which CenturyLink and Level 3
provide service are conducting parallel reviews. While public utility commissions
(PUCs) in states such as Ohio and Utah have already approved the proposed
CenturyLink/Level 3 merger, other states, such as New York and perhaps Washington,
apparently intend somewhat lengthier and more detailed reviews.
The parallel state reviews can be
problematic unless conducted properly and without delay. So, state PUCs now considering
the proposed CenturyLink/Level 3 merger ought to act with dispatch and focus on
merger-specific competitive effects only. The FCC can provide PUCs
encouragement in these respects by directing its review of the proposed
CenturyLink/Level 3 merger to the likely public benefits and by completing its review
proceeding with dispatch.
As explained in my Perspectives from FSF Scholars paper, the “CenturyLink/Level 3 Merger Should Bring Pro-Competitive Public Benefits” in the enterprise broadband market. Enterprise broadband services deliver high volumes of data with performance quality guarantees using dedicated network facilities. These services typically are negotiated at arms-length and used by sophisticated business customers, not residential consumers.
A combined CenturyLink/Level 3 would be
better able to serve business customers in multiple geographic locations,
relying more on its own fiber network and less on capacity leased from
third-party providers. Increased on-network capabilities and end-user
connections offer superior technical performance and responsiveness to business
customers. Many business customers prefer use of a single provider relying on a
single network to meet their enterprise broadband needs. Importantly, the
proposed merger presents no genuine concerns for residential broadband or video
consumers, since Level 3 serves neither of those residential markets.
By combining resources
and thereby creating new efficiencies through economies of scope and scale,
mergers enable providers of enterprise broadband or other services to better
serve consumers through enhanced offerings, lower prices, or both. It is therefore
important that proposed mergers subject to review – particularly transactions
that are pro-competitive on their face – be considered promptly and properly.
On its face, the proposed CenturyLink/Level 3 certainly appears to be
pro-competitive. It ought not be bogged down by multiple regulatory reviews that
move slowly or that become preoccupied with issues unrelated to the
transaction.
My 2010 FSF Perspectives from FSF Scholars paper, “Multiple Government Regulatory Reviews Burden Telecom Mergers with Too Many Conditions,” explained how state PUC reviews of mergers can result in costly, time-consuming, redundant reviews by multiple regulators. State PUC regulators can succumb in merger reviews to many of the temptations that have plagued FCC reviews. Regulators can become preoccupied with non-merger specific issues and use their leverage to impose regulatory conditions on their approval that are unrelated to the transaction or perhaps more fit for industry-wide rulemakings.
As I’ve previously written, “[t]he individualized nature of mergers means that onerous conditions amount to company-specific regulation that may result in unequal and unfair treatment.” Lengthy merger reviews become particularly susceptible to interest group special pleading rather than sound analysis of potential competitive effects. And by imposing conditions on merging providers of IP-enabled broadband services, state PUCs can engage in de facto regulation outside their typically narrow scope of delegated authority. Given that one or more federal authorities – such as the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the FCC – routinely review major proposed mergers, there is indeed reason to question whether state regulators should be conducting such duplicative reviews.
My 2010 FSF Perspectives from FSF Scholars paper, “Multiple Government Regulatory Reviews Burden Telecom Mergers with Too Many Conditions,” explained how state PUC reviews of mergers can result in costly, time-consuming, redundant reviews by multiple regulators. State PUC regulators can succumb in merger reviews to many of the temptations that have plagued FCC reviews. Regulators can become preoccupied with non-merger specific issues and use their leverage to impose regulatory conditions on their approval that are unrelated to the transaction or perhaps more fit for industry-wide rulemakings.
As I’ve previously written, “[t]he individualized nature of mergers means that onerous conditions amount to company-specific regulation that may result in unequal and unfair treatment.” Lengthy merger reviews become particularly susceptible to interest group special pleading rather than sound analysis of potential competitive effects. And by imposing conditions on merging providers of IP-enabled broadband services, state PUCs can engage in de facto regulation outside their typically narrow scope of delegated authority. Given that one or more federal authorities – such as the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the FCC – routinely review major proposed mergers, there is indeed reason to question whether state regulators should be conducting such duplicative reviews.
State PUCs reviewing the proposed
CenturyLink/Level 3 merger should exercise self-restraint. They should avoid
issues unrelated to the transaction and not impose needless administrative expenses
or lost market opportunity costs through drawn-out proceedings. For those state
PUCs that examine the proposed CenturyLink/Level 3 merger, it should be evident
that the transaction will likely improve competitiveness in enterprise
broadband services and that residential broadband and video subscribers will
not lose a provider – or be impacted at all.
Thus, the states should not allow their
reviews to place unnecessary conditions or shackles on what looks to be a
pro-competitive merger, or to unduly delay its consummation.