In a piece titled, “Thinking
Things Through – Maintain That Line,” published on February 27, 2018, I
contended that, as a matter of fundamental principle, it is important that
“[d]igital broadband services should not be regulated under the same public
utility-like Title II regulatory regime established for analog narrowband
telecommunications services and applied to them throughout the 20th
Century.” I contended that the “line that prevents Internet service providers
from being classified and regulated as common carriers in a public utility-like
fashion should not be crossed.”
Here I want to think through – contend for if you will –
another fundamental principle: Digital broadband services should not be subject
to state regulation that is inconsistent with the decades-old national policy
favoring light touch regulation of information services.
Of course, it is well-known by now that many states, either
through the adoption of new laws or the promulgation of executive orders, are
attempting to impose various “net neutrality” mandates on Internet service
providers (ISPs) offering services to the general public and/or through
procurement contracts to state agencies. In effect, these laws and executive
orders, absent preemption by the FCC, would re-impose the very public utility-like
regulation that the FCC repealed in its December 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order (RIF Order).
If Internet service providers are required to operate under
a patchwork of regulation imposed by the various states – a patchwork of public
utility-like regulation incompatible with the federal deregulatory policy –
then it is likely investment in new broadband facilities will be deterred and
innovation chilled with respect to the development of new services.
This is exactly what the FCC concluded in the early 1980s in
its seminal Computer II decisions
when it first drew what it called a “bright line” between the newly emerging
online services – then called “enhanced services” but now “information
services” without any material change in definition – and basic
telecommunications services. There the Commission established the policy of
non-regulation for information services as distinct from common carrier
regulation of telecommunications services. Importantly for present purposes,
the Commission declared that its deregulatory policy preempted inconsistent
state regulation so that the online services could grow free from state
economic regulation that would stifle their growth. The FCC’s preemptive
authority was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Computer
& Communications Industry Ass’n v. FCC in 1982.
Likewise, the FCC’s preemptive authority regarding state
regulation incompatible with federal policy was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upon review of the agency’s late 1980s Computer III proceedings. The FCC had
relaxed some of the requirements applicable to the Bell Companies provision of
information services – moving from a strict structural separation regime to one
employing nonstructural safeguards – and preempted state regulations that would
have imposed more stringent mandates. Significantly, in California v. FCC (1994), the court declared: “The FCC has
presented adequate record support for its conclusion that because of economic
and operational factors, enhanced service providers would separate their
facilities for service that are offered both interstate and intrastate, thereby
essentially negating the FCC’s goal of allowing integrated provision of both
enhanced and basic services.”
With this backdrop in mind, it should not be surprising –
nor is it insignificant – that when Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act
in 1996 it declared it to be federal policy “to preserve the vibrant and free
market that presently exists for Internet and other interactive computer
services” and further that information services should remain “unfettered by
Federal or state regulation.’ 47 U.S.C. Section 230. In essence, Congress
stated clearly that information services should continue to be subject to the
deregulatory policy established in the early 1980s in Computer II and that this is a matter of national policy.
Of course, there have been many, many more pronouncements
along the way to the same effect, by both the FCC and the courts. So, the FCC’s
declaration in the Restoring Internet
Freedom Order – like Congress’s declaration in the 1996 Telecommunications
Act – should in no way be surprising. Indeed, the surprise would have been had
there been no such declaration.
Here is what the FCC stated in the RIF Order:
Federal courts have uniformly held
that an affirmative federal policy of deregulation
is entitled to the same preemptive effective as a policy of regulation. In
addition, allowing state or local regulation of Internet access service could
impair the provision of such service by requiring each ISP to comply with a
patchwork of separate and potentially conflicting requirements across all of
the jurisdictions in which it operates.
The FCC went on to explain that it is “well-settled that
Internet access service is a jurisdictionally interstate service because ‘a
substantial portion of Internet traffic involves accessing interstate and
foreign websites.’” And then, once again significantly: “Because both
interstate and intrastate communications can travel over the same Internet
connection (and indeed may do so in response to a single query from a
consumer), it is impossible or impracticable for ISPs to distinguish between
intrastate and interstate communications over the Internet or to apply
different rules in each circumstance.” In this situation, state actions that
have the effect of regulating and burdening an inherently interstate service
are impermissible under the Commerce Clause.
It should be crystal clear from the foregoing that, dating
back to the landmark Computer II
decisions, there is a long history supporting the Commission’s declared intent
to preempt inconsistent state public utility-like economic regulation that
conflicts with the national policy that Internet providers should not be
subject to a patchwork of conflicting state regulation, whether in the form of
laws, executive orders, or other regulatory impositions.
I should reiterate once again, as I did in “Thinking
Things Through – Maintain That Line,” that the exercise of the Commission’s
preemptive authority does not leave consumers or competitors unprotected or
without recourse with regard to claims of alleged abusive ISPs practices. Not
only will they have recourse to the Federal Trade Commission, with its consumer
protection and competition authority, and the Department of Justice, with its
antitrust authority, but they will have recourse as well to state laws and
regulations, including consumer protection laws, of general jurisdiction. As
the FCC stated in 2004 in the Vonage
Preemption Order, the federal deregulatory policy regarding information
services “refers primarily to economic public utility-type regulation, as
opposed to generally applicable commercial consumer protection statutes, or
similarly generally applicable state laws.”
So, in sum, just as one fundamental principle requires maintaining
the deregulatory line that prevents today’s Internet service providers from
being regulated like public utilities, another, correlative fundamental
principle requires that, in order for Internet services to continue to thrive
and to respond to consumer demands in a fast-changing marketplace, the FCC’s
deregulatory policy must be applied on a national basis.