Supreme Court Makes a Sensible Ruling on Anti-Autodialing Statute

On April 1, the U.S. Supreme Court released its decision in Facebook v. Duguid regarding the scope of the federal statute that prohibits unwanted robocalls from "autodialers." Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the court, which was joined by seven other justices and unanimous in the result, sums up the anti-autodialing provision, the question before the court, and its ruling:

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) proscribes abusive telemarketing practices by, among other things, imposing restrictions on making calls with an "automatic telephone dialing system." As defined by the TCPA, an "automatic telephone dialing system" is a piece of equipment with the capacity both "to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator," and to dial those numbers. 47 U. S. C. §227(a)(1). The question before the Court is whether that definition encompasses equipment that can "store" and dial telephone numbers, even if the device does not "us[e] a random or sequential number generator." It does not. To qualify as an "automatic telephone dialing system," a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone number using a random or sequential generator or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. 

As the Court notes, the FCC has interpreted the anti-autodialing provision to apply to text messages. At issue in the case was Facebook's sending of text messages to users whose numbers it had stored. This blog takes no view on whatever specific processes or techniques that Facebook used. Rather, the decision was important in rejecting an over-expansive definition of an "autodialer" that potentially would subject countless American's to potential claims under the TCPA:

Expanding the definition of an autodialer to encompass any equipment that merely stores and dials telephone numbers would take a chainsaw to these nuanced problems when Congress meant to use a scalpel. Duguid’s interpretation of an autodialer would capture virtually all modern cell phones, which have the capacity to "store . . . telephone numbers to be called" and "dial such numbers." §227(a)(1). The TCPA's liability provisions, then, could affect ordinary cell phone owners in the course of commonplace usage, such as speed dialing or sending automated text message responses. See §227(b)(3) (authorizing a $500 fine per violation, increased to $1,500 if the sender acted "willfully" or "knowingly").  

Professor Daniel Lyons, a member of the Free State Foundation's Board of Academic Advisers, previewed the Court's just-released decision in his Perspectives from FSF Scholars paper titled "Trilogy of Supreme Court Cases Highlight Deficiencies in Anti-Robocall Statute."

FCC Should Follow District Court's Common-Sense Ruling on Autodialers

Free State Foundation President Randolph May and I have previously written about the federal ban on "autodialers" contained in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). In our Perspectives from FSF Scholars paper, "The FCC Should Stop Runaway Liability for Smartphone Owners," we called on the Commission to adopt a sensible definition of "autodialers" that tracks with a plain reading of the TCPA and its intent to combat commercial automated mass robocallers. Going forward, the Commission ought to consider the common-sense reading of the TCPA's "autodialer" provision by a federal district court's decision from September 2019. 

In Smith v. Premier Dermatology, Judge Jorge Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois wrote:

[T]he plain text of the statutory definition provides that an ATDS [autodialer] is a device that (1) stores or produces telephone numbers that (2) were randomly or sequentially generated and (3) dials them automatically. 

Because the Court finds that the statutory definition is not ambiguous, it need not reach plaintiffs' arguments about "the context and the structure of the statutory scheme." …But even if the Court were to consider them, they are unpersuasive. 

The District Court's conclusion that the TCPA's language is unambiguous as well and interpretation of prohibited "autodialer" capabilities are both contrary to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego LLC(2018). As Mr. May and I explained in our Perspectives paper, the Ninth Circuit deemed the relevant statutory language and ambiguous and misinterpreted "autodialers" to include callers using equipment that is merely capable of dialing ortexting a stored telephone number. The court disregarded the TCPA's provision that autodialer equipment also must have number generating capability – and dial the telephone numbers automatically. In consequence, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marks makes anyone with a smartphone potentially liable under the TCPA for making a single unwanted phone call or text. (I also addressed the autodialer issue in my Perspectives paper, "The FCC Should Halt Bogus Lawsuits Threatening Popular Texting Services.")

A federal district court decision does not create binding precedent. So the legal uncertainty caused by the Ninth Circuit's misguided decision in Marks remains a problem that requires the FCC's attention. However, the Commission should take stock of the District Court's sensible ruling in Premier Dermatology. And the Commission should adopt a narrower autodialer definition that targets mass robocallers while avoiding open-ended liability for all smartphone owners.