Internet Archive's Fair Use Defense Fails Again at Appeals Court

On September 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decision in Hachette Book Group, Inc. v. Internet Archive. The Second Circuit panel affirmed a District Court's March 2023 entry of summary judgment against Internet Archive for infringing the copyrights of four book publishers in 127 books.  

Internet Archive created unauthorized digital copies of those books as part of its "Free Digital Library" and mostly. Beginning in 2018, the Internet Archive made digital copies of those copyrighted books available online to the public. Starting in 2020, the Internet Archive provided the public access to those copyrighted books on a one-to-one owned-to-loaned ratio under a practice that the Internet Archive called "Controlled Digital Lending" or "CDL." The District Court found that all of the elements for infringement were established by the publishers, and the court rejected Internet Archive's fair use defense.

The Second Circuit's decision mostly tracked with the District Court's decision, concluding that "IA's lending of its 'own' digital books that 'are commercially available for sale or license in any electronic text format'" is not fair use. 

According to the appeals court, "because IA's Free Digital Library primarily supplants the original Works without adding meaningfully new or different features that avoid unduly impinging on Publishers' rights to prepare derivative works, its use of the Works is not transformative." Although the Second Circuit differed from the District Court in concluding that the alleged fair use was not commercial in nature, it nonetheless held that "because the Works in Suit are 'of the type that the copyright laws value and seek to protect,' the second fair use factor favors Publishers." The court determined that copying and posting the entirety of the work was not secondary to some other use that would offer significant functional benefits not associated with the original works and that "not only is IA's Free Digital Library likely to serve as a substitute for the originals, the undisputed evidence suggests it is intended to achieve that exact result." 

 

The Second Circuit further determined that "IA has not met its 'burden of proving that the secondary use does not compete in the relevant market[s]' and that “[i]ts empirical evidence does not disprove market harm, and Publishers convincingly claim both present and future market harm." The court concluded that "[a]ny short-term public benefits of IA's Free Digital Library are outweighed not only by harm to Publishers and authors but also by the long-term detriments society may suffer if IA's infringing use were allowed to continue." And it found that all of the fair use factors favored the copyright owners. 

 

Aside from its loss in Hachette, Internet Archive faces additional troubles due to alleged infringements of copyrighted music recordings." My September 2023 Perspectives From FSF Scholars, "Internet Archive to Face the Music for Mass Copyright Infringement," analyzes copyright infringement claims raised in UMG Recordings v. Internet Archive. At issue in that case is Internet Archive's "Great 78 Project," which allegedly copied, stored, distributed, and publicly performed thousands of copyrighted pre-1972 music recordings without authorization. 

 

The decision in Hachette may offer persuasive insights for the District Court in UMG Recordings, insofar as Internet Archive again relies on fair use as an affirmative defense to infringement claims. For starters, the "Great 78 Project" involves no apparent transformative use or significant functional new benefit not inherent in the original works themselves. Scratches or analog background noises from digital recordings of vinyl copies of pre-72 recordings being played on turntables are hardly transformative. Expect FSF scholars to have more to say in the future about the ongoing case of UMG Recordings v. Internet Archive.

Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments Copyright Case on "Transformative" Works

On October 12, the U.S. Supreme Court held oral arguments in Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith. The case involves a series of prints and illustrations by the late Andy Warhol that are based on a copyrighted 1981 photo of the late music artist Prince. One image from that series was published – without authorization of the owner of the photo – on a magazine cover in May 2016. At issue in the case is the fair use doctrine and the nature or role of "transformative" works in fair use analysis. 

The Petitioner, Andy Warhol Foundation, presented  the question to the Court in a hedged manner: 

Whether a work of art is "transformative" when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material (as this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and other courts of appeals have held), or whether a court is forbidden from considering the meaning of the accused work where it "recognizably deriv[es] from" its source material (as the Second Circuit has held). 

Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement, and it consists of four non-exclusive factors that are to be considered in evaluating whether the use of a copyrighted work is "fair:" (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Under Supreme Court precedents such as Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (1994), courts typically analyze the first factor according to the degree to which the use is "transformative" – that is, "whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message." 

 

However, Section 106(2) secures to copyright owners the exclusive right to prepare "derivative works" based upon the copyrighted work. According to Section 101:

A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."

Some insightful commentaries have been published about Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith, and Free State Foundation scholars likely will address the case more definitively once the Supreme Court has issued its decision. Until then, a general observation here is that the Petitioner's seeming overemphasis on an artist's subjective intent or interpretation of a copyrighted work as rendering a secondary work "transformative" and thus a fair use would, if adopted by the Court, encroach significantly on a copyright owner's exclusive right to prepare derivative works. During the oral arguments, Justice Amy Coney Barrett appeared to make this point – or at least a similar point – when she stated to the Petitioner's counsel: "And it seems to me like your test, this meaning or message test, risks stretching the concept of transformation so broadly that it kind of eviscerates Factor 1 and puts all of the emphasis on Factor 4." 

Additionally, I second FSF President Randolph May in commending the Committee for Justice for its amicus curiae brief in this case. As explained in his August 18 blog post, CFJ's amicus brief skillfully sets forth the conceptual underpinnings of copyright law as it pertains to the fair use doctrine. And their brief applies that background understanding to the transformative works claims being made in Andy Warhol v. Goldsmith.