Justice Kavanaugh's US Telecom Dissent Could Govern Platform Speech

Slightly less than a month ago, in NetChoice v. Paxton, the Supreme Court restored a preliminary injunction that prevented Texas's social media common carriage law, HB20, from taking effect. I already wrote about Justice Alito's dissent in that case, and as I noted back then, the Supreme Court's 5-4 majority did not explain its reasoning. This time, I'm going to take a stab at guessing that reasoning, and my guess involves then-Judge Kavanaugh's dissent in US Telecom v. FCC (2017).

Justice Kavanaugh, a member of the NetChoice majority, possibly showed his cards years earlier while dissenting from the denial of en banc review as a D.C. Circuit Judge in US Telecom. In that case, Kavanaugh explained his belief that the First Amendment bars the imposition of "net neutrality" regulations, including prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid-prioritization, on broadband providers. Specifically, Kavanaugh relied on Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC (1997), which he interpreted as ruling that First Amendment protections for editorial discretion apply to modern communications services, even though Turner addressed cable television rather than broadband. Kavanaugh would have applied the editorial protection afforded to cable providers in Turner to broadband providers.

Here, of course, we deal with Internet service providers, not cable television operators. But Internet service providers and cable operators perform the same kinds of functions in their respective networks. Just like cable operators, Internet service providers deliver content to consumers. Internet service providers may not necessarily generate much content of their own, but they may decide what content they will transmit, just as cable operators decide what content they will transmit. Deciding whether and how to transmit ESPN and deciding whether and how to transmit ESPN.com are not meaningfully different for First Amendment purposes.

Then, and most relevant to guessing the Court's possible reasoning in NetChoice, Kavanaugh argued that, in order to overcome the "intermediate scrutiny" protection the First Amendment affords to editorial discretion, the government needed to make a credible finding that broadband providers had market power. The FCC's order adopting the net neutrality regulations did not do that. To show the consequences of that omission, Kavanaugh argued that, if that approach were adopted, Congress could impose similar regulations on Internet platforms such as Facebook, Google/YouTube, and Twitter, and even traditional publishers like the New York Times, without obstacle.

If market power need not be shown, the Government could regulate the editorial decisions of Facebook and Google, of MSNBC and Fox, of NYTimes.com and WSJ.com, of YouTube and Twitter. Can the Government really force Facebook and Google and all of those other entities to operate as common carriers? Can the Government really impose forced-carriage or equal-access obligations on YouTube and Twitter? If the Government’s theory in this case were accepted, then the answers would be yes. After all, if the Government could force Internet service providers to carry unwanted content even absent a showing of market power, then it could do the same to all those other entities as well. There is no principled distinction between this case and those hypothetical cases.

The underlying sentiment of Kavanaugh's "slippery slope" argument above is that there is something wrong with common carriage regulation of Internet platforms and traditional publishers. And the Court long ago ruled that something is indeed wrong with common carriage style regulation of newspapers in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974).

Perhaps the Court's majority in NetChoice reached the same conclusion as Kavanaugh in US Telecom, relying on cases like Turner and Tornillo as an indication that NetChoice is likely to succeed on the merits of its case, which is one of the factors for granting a preliminary injunction.

For now, we do not know the Court's reasoning, but Kavanaugh's opinion in US Telecom is a good place to start guessing. And we also do not know, assuming the majority embraced Kavanaugh's reasoning, whether a majority of the Justices would do the same in the context of common carriage regulation of broadband service. As Justice Alito explained in his NetChoice dissent, the Court has taken different First Amendment approaches for different technologies.

But we do know that, as NetChoice continues to move through the courts, it will have broad implications on communications and First Amendment law.