Supreme Court Declines to Hear Case on Direct Copyright Infringement

On October 2, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Sagan (2022). I wrote about this case in my September 20 Perspectives from FSF Scholars, "Supreme Court Should Clarify the Law on Direct Infringement of Copyrighted Works." By declining to grant review of the case, the court unfortunately passed up the opportunity to set the law straight that a defendant that orders and participates in an infringement can be liable for direct infringement even if the defendant did not personally perform the literal act of copying the copyrighted work. 

As explained in my Perspectives paper, the Second Circuit went off course in Sagan by improperly applying the "volitional conduct" requirement for direct infringement liability. The lower court wrote that "direct liability attaches only to 'the person who actually presses the button.'" But that is at odds with a copyright owner's "exclusive rights to do and to authorize" under Section 106 of the Copyright Act. As the Supreme Court observed, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984), "an infringer is not merely one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner."

 

By refusing to hear the case, the court lets stand the Sixth Circuit's decision that unduly narrows the traditional understanding direct infringement and that conflicts with decisions in at least other circuits. For instance, in Society of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory (2012), the First Circuit emphasized that an infringer includes "one who authorizes the use of the copyright work without actual authority from the copyright owner" – quoting Sony. And in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. (1992), the Ninth Circuit recognized that "infringement by authorization is a form of direct infringement."

 

For now, it is to be hoped that other lower courts will decline to follow the Sixth Circuit's misapplication of the volitional conduct requirement and unduly narrow definition of direct infringement that undermines the ability of copyright owners to enforce their exclusive rights.