With what my mother always called "the dog days of summer" fast upon us, and while we're anxiously awaiting Homeland or Boardwalk Empire to start up again, I've got just the hot short video for your August viewing. I'll call it "FCC Reform: The Video" to get your juices flowing.
OK, Homeland or Boardwalk Empire it's not...
But, as regular readers know, I am passionate about FCC regulatory reform, even during dog days. In the video immediately below, which runs only 10 minutes, I discuss the "FCC Process Reform Act" and the "FCC Consolidated Reporting Act" bills put forward in the House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology by Chairman Greg Walden and the "FCC's 'ABCs' Act" put forward by Subcommittee Vice Chairman Bob Latta.
In the video, I explain why the proposed changes to the FCC's rulemaking requirements in the FCC Process Reform Act are needed in order to reorient the FCC away from its tendency to default to regulation even when there is no clear and convincing evidence of market failure or consumer harm. And I support the adoption of revisions to the FCC's forbearance and periodic regulatory review authority. Indeed, I proposed just such changes in April 2011.
I also explain in the video why the merger review reform provisions contained in the Process Reform Act should be adopted and why the proposed Consolidated Reporting Act makes perfect sense in today's multi-platform competitive, converged marketplace environment.
And there's more...but I shouldn't keep you from watching any longer.
My testimony before the
House Subcommittee at the July 11, 2013, hearing on "Improving FCC
Process" is here.
My July 16 blog entitled "FCC Regulatory Reform and
Administrative Law" is here.
Since the Third Computer Inquiry rules
were adopted in 1986, the FCC has received multiple rounds of comments,
including in an outstanding
rulemaking proceeding, concerning whether the rules should be eliminated. Despite
its recognition that the market has changed drastically, the FCC recently denied
a US Telecom request for forbearance from these rules. Instead it once again requested
comment on the rules’ elimination. The available evidence justifies that these
rules should promptly be consigned to the graveyard reserved for outdated
regulations.
The Computer III rules established a complex
framework that was designed to enable independent “enhanced services” providers
to purchase piece parts of the analog telephone network. These rules now apply
only to three companies in a growing field of wired and wireless network
providers of considerable size and strength.
Some rules
have been streamlined (in its recent forbearance order the FCC rightfully
eliminated thousands of annual pages of compliance reports) and the Computer III rules for broadband have largely
been eliminated.
Notwithstanding, the substantive rules remain in place for a much narrower
category of so called “narrowbanding” enhanced services. The Commission specifically
identified only a small number of voice mail and alarm monitoring service
providers that currently rely on Computer
III functionality.
US Telecom
demonstrated
that these “narrowbanding” services are being provided today over broadband and
cable TV networks without reliance on Computer
III functionality. Current evidence of competing facilities-based network
platforms provide alternatives that justify eliminating the substantive Computer III rules.
Computer III was adopted when telephone
service was largely a monopoly. Since then, multiple network platforms provide
a communications path into the home. In 2010, Cable
MVPD facilities passed 98.5 percent, and wireless
services covered over 97.8 percent, of homes. Over 93 percent of Americans in
2012 could
receive wireline broadband services at 3 Mbps download speeds or greater.
In its denial
of US Telecom’s forbearance request, the Commission asserted that it needed
evidence that alternative services were available on competitive terms. This
focus was overly narrow and misplaced. The Commission should instead evaluate
the technological capabilities of alternative network platforms to determine
whether there is a sufficient competitive alternative to Computer III-compliant facilities. The FCC engaged in such an
inquiry when it deregulated wireline broadband without looking at specific
prices. The same type of inquiry for narrowbanding enhanced services would
demonstrate that competitive alternatives do exist, which would promote
reasonable terms. There is thus no reason to force Computer III carriers to identify irrelevant information that they
may not even be able to access in the first place.
Given the
existence of competing alternative platforms, there is little need to be
concerned that either consumers or providers could not find “enhanced” services
without the legacy rules. In the past, the Commission has solved this type of potential
disruption to consumers and providers through limited grandfathering, such as
it did when wireline broadband was
deregulated. With a reasonable time to locate an alternative source of
supply, there is no further need for continued regulation to assure consumer
protection.
The FCC
should not retain rules solely to protect existing business plans or services. Both
the FCC and the antitrust laws have long refused to protect individual competitors
rather than competition. Freezing services in place stifles innovation and
unnecessarily increases carrier costs.
The
Commission has admitted that the Computer
III requirements are burdensome. Other public interest benefits support
elimination. As the Commission found when deregulating wireline broadband, eliminating
Computer III is in the public
interest because it would promote innovation and investment, and reduce
compliance costs. And unnecessary rules should be repealed in any event because
they skew competition, harming consumers.
It is also
ironic that the FCC elsewhere has announced
that it needs to promote conversion to a modern network to promote broadband
and meet other goals. Its stubborn retention of legacy rules applicable only to
the analog PSTN, such as the Computer III
rules, potentially works at cross purposes with these other goals.
In its NPRM
to explore elimination of the remaining Computer
III rules, the Commission should rely on available evidence to eliminate
these unnecessary rules without further delay. Competition will continue to
make available services consumers desire through a variety of platforms. Computer III: Rest In Peace.
My March 14 blog "FCC
Opts for Delay over Deregulation in Forbearance Process,"
I cited a dozen sorry examples of agency delay in deciding forbearance
petitions. At the time of posting, two significant petitions were pending—a USTelecom petition seeking relief from 17 categories of
legacy voice service regulations and a CenturyLink relief from enforcement of
legacy regulations with respect to its enterprise broadband services. And I
observed the FCC granted itself 90-day extensions in reviewing both of those
pending petitions.
Ultimately, the FCC's stuck to its delay-prone
pattern. The final bylines for both petitions could just as well be added to
the dozen examples I cited earlier. To wit:
USTelecom Forbearance Order (2013), granting,
in part forbearance from legacy voice services regulations (petition filed, Feb. 16, 2012; order granting relief, in part, and
granting extension, Feb. 19, 2013; final order adopted, May 10, 2013; final
order released, May 17, 2013)
CenturyLink
Broadband Enterprise Petition (2012-3) seeking relief from legacy regulations with respect to enterprise broadband
services (petition filed, Feb. 23, 2012;
extension granted, Feb. 22, 2013; order requiring additional information and
public notice requesting data, March 5; petition to withdraw granted, March 20)
This is a sorry addendum to make, particularly
in the case of CenturyLink, which sought relief identical to that which was
granted to other providers through the FCC's Enterprise Broadband Orders.
There is a
growing consensus that a new Digital Age Communications Act is needed that reflects
the technologically dynamic, increasingly competitive digital age
communications marketplace. The current "smokestack" regime, grounded
in outdated techno-functional constructs that apply differential regulatory
burdens to comparable competitive services, needs to go.
But it is also
pretty clear that it may be some time before the growing consensus leads to
adoption of the necessary radical overhaul of the current law.
In the meantime,
Congress could simply modify one provision of the current law to require the
Federal Communications Commission to act in a less regulatory fashion than the
agency generally does now.
Section 10, the "forbearance
provision," mandates that the Commission "shall forbear" from applying any regulation or statutory
provision if the agency determines enforcement of such requirement "is not
necessary" to ensure that a telecommunications carrier's charges and practices
are reasonable and "not necessary for the protection of consumers,"
and that forbearance is consistent with the public interest.
This provision
is unique among regulatory statues, and Congress obviously intended the FCC to
use it as a deregulatory tool. For example, under the provision, if the
Commission does not deny a forbearance petition within the requisite statutory
period, it is "deemed granted." In other words, by its terms, the
statute evidences a deregulatory intention.
As we have detailed
over the years at the Free State Foundation, the FCC has employed its
forbearance authority too sparingly, often refusing to acknowledge new realities
that, in effect, mean consumers can be protected more effectively by the
competitive marketplace than by outdated legacy regulations. For example, as my
colleague Seth Cooper has demonstrated in "Forbearance Follies" and
elsewhere, in denying several petitions for forbearance relief the agency
simply dismissed wireless service as a competitive alternative to wireline
service. The Commission acted this way despite the fact that over 30% of U.S.
households have discontinued their wireline service.
As I suggested
in April 2011, to redress the FCC's reluctance to grant warranted regulatory
relief, a sentence could be added at the end of Section 10(a) to the effect
that: "In making the foregoing determinations, absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the Commission shall presume that enforcement of such
regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that a telecommunications
carrier's charges or practices are not unreasonable or unreasonably
discriminatory or necessary for the protection of consumers and is consistent
with the public interest."
I explained in
the "Modest Proposal" essay that
establishing such an deregulatory evidentiary presumption in Section 10
"would not dictate the outcome
of the Commission's assessment of any particular forbearance petition." That
is not the intent.
"But the
presumption would require the Commission to grant regulatory relief absent the
presentation of convincing evidence to the effect that the requisite consumer
protection and public interest showings have not been made. This should make it
more difficult, for example, for the Commission to ignore or minimize the
significance of evidence of wireless substitution for wireline in performing a
competition analysis."
I made in clear
in a blog posted in May 20111 that the amended
forbearance provision incorporating the deregulatory evidentiary presumption
should apply not only to telecom carriers, as is presently the case, but as
well to cable operators and other entities regulated by the Commission. There
is no reason that any entity subject to a Commission regulatory mandate should
not be eligible to seek relief.
It is a hopeful
sign that there is increasing support for reform of the forbearance process as
a means of granting regulatory relief when justified by competitive marketplace
realities. In his superb keynote address at FSF's March 21 Fifth
Annual Telecom Policy Conference, I was especially gratified that Senator Marco
Rubio declared that the forbearance process should be reformed "so it is
more difficult for the FCC to reject regulatory relief petitions when they are
justified." This is exactly right.
And, along the
same lines, in his Conversation with me, Commissioner Pai stated that there is "no
question the telecommunication marketplace in particular has undergone
revolutionary change" and that it "is much more competitive than it
has ever been." He agreed that my forbearance proposal was
"interesting" because the Commission should be "more liberal in
its application of forbearance authority."
Immediately
below, and also here, are links to the videos of Senator
Rubio's keynote and the Conversation
with Commissioner Pai. Of course, in addition to the remarks relating to
forbearance, there is much more of value for those of a reform-minded bent.
But, today, I am
focusing on reforming the Communications Act's forbearance provision by
inclusion of a deregulatory evidentiary presumption along the lines I have
suggested in my proposal.
Pending a
much-needed wholesale overhaul of the Communications Act, reforming the
forbearance process offers an interim avenue for spurring the FCC, more
regularly, to grant justified regulatory relief that comports with the
competitive realities of today's digital marketplace environment.
I hope some
reform-minded Senator or Representative – or a whole group of them – will pick
up the reform cudgel and lead the effort.
To view videos of FSF’s Seventeenth Annual Policy Conference, March 2025, at the National Press Club, click herehere!
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