A forbearance petition now
being considered by the FCC has important consequences for the future of
broadband in the United States. A positive outcome – one that will best promote
investment in network infrastructure upgrades and competition in the enterprise
broadband services market – is much to be desired.
But such an outcome depends
on two critical factors: first, the FCC's adhering to the rule of law; and
second, its taking a deregulatory approach to facilitating the transition from
copper-based legacy networks to all-Internet Protocol (IP) networks.
The pro-investment and
pro-deployment incentives offered by deregulation of enterprise broadband
services formed the basis of my prior blog post, "FCC
Forbearance Needed to Further Broadband's Benefits." That post
regarded a pending CenturyLink forbearance petition. Some of CenturyLink's
Ethernet and other broadband enterprise offerings remain subject to dominant
carrier and Computer Inquiry
tariff obligations. But CenturyLink is not a dominant carrier, the enterprise
broadband market is highly competitive, and most of its rivals are not subject
to similar regulations. Some of its rivals have even secured forbearance relief
from those regulations. Based on those considerations, I made the case for why
the FCC should consider CenturyLink's petition in a favorable light.
Nonetheless, opponents of
deregulation have called for the FCC to throw up roadblocks to forbearance
relief. It has been suggested that the FCC should disregard its deregulatory
and court-approved precedents granting forbearance for enterprise broadband services.
The agency is being urged to expand its pro-regulatory framework for analyzing
forbearance petitions in cases involving legacy voice services to enterprise
broadband services. Such an approach would be highly problematic on several
counts.
Forbearing from regulating
enterprise broadband services would be in keeping with the rule of law. Through
a series of orders issued between 2006 and 2008 – its Enterprise Broadband
Orders – the FCC granted forbearance
relief to several incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) from the same
regulations at issue in CenturyLink's petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit expressly upheld the FCC's analytical approach
and granting of forbearance relief in Ad
Hoc Telecommunications v. FCC
(2009).
This clear set of precedents
for analyzing forbearance petitions involving enterprise broadband services
should straightforwardly apply to CenturyLink's petition. In the time since its
Enterprise Broadband Orders, those services have been further deployed and the
market has become even more competitive. So there are no good reasons for the FCC to disregard its
precedents. And there are certainly no good reasons for CenturyLink to remain subject to disparate regulatory
treatment.
Regulatory uncertainty and
confusion would almost surely result if the Enterprise Broadband Orders were
to be suddenly discarded. Inequity
would also result. Such an agency about-face would likely be deemed arbitrary
and capricious by a court of law.
Continued FCC adherence to
its Enterprise Broadband Orders is also sound policy. As the agency recognized in
those precedents, the market for switched-packet data systems is "highly
competitive." High financial returns for enterprise broadband service
providers incentivize wider infrastructure deployment and market entry. Echoing
this point was the D.C. Circuit in Ad Hoc Telecommunications: "Perhaps an obvious point, but a decision that
gives owners of telecommunications lines more control over access to those
lines tends to increase the incentive for competitors to build competing
lines."
In its 2011 USF
Reform Order, the FCC reiterated the National Broadband Plan's
"express goal of facilitating industry progression to all-IP
networks." But discarding deregulatory precedents would undermine that
progression. The policy imperative of promoting IP networks is best furthered
by forbearing from regulating broadband services. Once relieved of dominant
carrier regulations and tariff obligations, enterprise broadband service
providers will be empowered to offer more flexible and competitive pricing options
to business customers and thereby incentivized to more aggressively invest in
broadband infrastructure to meet those customer demands.
It would be a mistake for
the FCC to pull enterprise broadband services under the 2010 Qwest Phoenix
MSA Order's framework. That order
established an analytical framework for analyzing forbearance petitions that
imposed high hurdles to deregulation. I have elsewhere criticized
that framework for its over-reliance on static market indicators, narrow
market definitions, and misconceptions regarding pricing in networked services
that are highly regulated. Similarly, I have pointed to the rule
of law problems with the Tenth Circuit's recent decision upholding the
FCC's "goalpost-moving" in the Qwest Phoenix MSA Order.
Those problems aside, what
is unmistakable is that the Qwest Phoenix MSA Order's framework applied specifically to legacy voice services, not broadband services. That order nowhere indicated
that it was somehow supplanting the Enterprise Broadband Orders' analytical approach. To the contrary, paragraph 39
of the Qwest Phoenix MSA Order stated:
Indeed, a different analysis may apply when the Commission addresses advanced services, like broadband services, instead of a petition addressing legacy facilities, such as Qwest’s petition in this proceeding. For advanced services, not only must we take into consideration the direction of section 706, but we must take into consideration that this newer market continues to evolve and develop in the absence of Title II regulation.
This
regulatory distinction between legacy voice services and broadband services
trades on Section 706's directive that the agency use forbearance to remove
barriers to investment in infrastructure for advanced services such as broadband.
The distinction also traces back to the FCC's 2003 Triennial Review Order and to its 2005 Wireline Broadband Order, which kept broadband free from unbundling
requirements and Title II common carrier requirements, respectively. The Qwest Phoenix MSA Order's framework, by contrast, is steeped in concerns underlying
unbundling and common carrier regulations applied only to legacy voice
services. Or to put it another way, as the D.C. Circuit declared in Ad Hoc
Telecommunications: "Broadband
services do not correspond to the old telephone-cable regulatory divide"
and both Congress and the FCC have recognized that "regulation of
broadband can pose different issues and challenges than regulation of local
telephony."
Should the FCC grant
CenturyLink's forbearance relief according to the standards established in its Enterprise
Broadband Orders, it would comply
with the rule of law. In so doing, the FCC would also fulfill the deregulatory
purpose of Section 706 by promoting investment in broadband infrastructure and
aiding the transition to all IP-networks. At a time when the nation desperately
needs additional capital investment and new job creation, this would be a good
thing.