The Supreme Court should promptly
deny certiorari in City of Eugene v. FCC, a case that has been pending before the court since November 4, 2021. The
cert petition, filed by numerous localities, argues for a non-textual reading
of the Communications Act and invents a non-existent preemption issue, all to
impose excess fees on information services provided over cable systems. But the
text of the Act prohibits such fees.
In City of Eugene, a
unanimous Sixth Circuit panel correctly interpreted the Communications Act as
expressly preempting imposition of franchise fees by states and local
governments on non-cable services provided over cable systems. The lower court
upheld most of the FCC's 2019 order that clarified limits on local governments'
authority to impose such fees. Free State Foundation Director of Policy Studies
Seth Cooper briefed the court's "sensible" opinion
shortly after its publication, and also observed that the mostly-affirmed 2019
order stopped localities from imposing fees "beyond the statute's limits,
potentially draining cable operator investment in their broadband Internet
networks."

To review, Section 541 of the
Cable Act of 1984 – which is incorporated into the Communications Act – requires
cable providers to receive authorization from a local franchising authority
(LFA) before providing cable service in the LFA's jurisdiction. In exchange for
granting this franchise, LFAs can subject franchisees to franchise fees, which
Section 542(g)(1) defines as "any tax, fee, or assessment of any kind
imposed by a franchising authority or other governmental entity on a cable
operator or cable subscriber, or both, solely because of their status as
such." But Section 542(b) caps franchise fees at "five percent of a
cable operator’s gross revenues for cable services for any 12-month
period." And critically, Section 544(b)(1) expressly prohibits regulation
of non-cable services in franchise agreements: an LFA "in its request for
proposals for a franchise… may establish requirements for facilities and
equipment, but may not… establish requirements for video programming or other
information services[.]"
The Sixth Circuit upheld most of the
FCC's 2019 order that preempted the City of
Eugene's 7% tax on cable broadband revenues. In an opinion by Judge Raymond Kethledge,
the court upheld the FCC's "mixed use rule," which prohibited LFAs
from taxing broadband Internet access service in franchise agreements, pursuant
to the Section 544(b)(1)'s prohibition on "establish[ing] requirements for
video programming or other information services." Because the Restoring
Internet Freedom Order classified broadband Internet access service as an information
service, it obviously fit under the prohibition. The Sixth Circuit also determined
that it didn't matter that Eugene taxed broadband by city ordinance instead of through
its franchise authority—either way, it acted as an LFA subject to the
Communications Act. Lastly, because Eugene's broadband tax was in direct
conflict with the prohibition on LFAs regulating information services, the
lower court concluded that the tax was expressly preempted by the
Communications Act.
Eugene and numerous localities now
argue that the Sixth Circuit decision conflicts with Oregon Supreme Court precedent
and presents a novel implied preemption issue. However, as NCTA notes in its Brief in Opposition, the Oregon Supreme Court
interpreted the relevant portion of the Communications Act years prior to the
FCC's 2019 order, meaning the record considered by the Oregon Supreme Court
lacked the Commission's interpretations – unlike the Sixth Circuit's decision
that benefited from a full record and the position of the relevant expert
agency. And because the Sixth Circuit opinion relied on express preemption,
there is no issue regarding implied preemption in this case. These two reasons
support denial of Eugene's cert petition.
Policy reasons further support
denial. When Congress passed the Cable Act of 1984, it sought to eliminate
competitive distortions in the market that arose from excess demands and taxes
on cable providers. Cable providers often paid multiple fees for access to a
single right-of-way prior to the Cable Act. Cable companies likely passed the
cost of these excesses to consumer in the form of higher prices. The FCC's
interpretation of the LFA-related statutory provisions, which the Sixth Circuit
upheld, serves the law's purpose of "minimiz[ing] unnecessary regulation
that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems."
Free State Foundation Scholars
have long supported the FCC's 2019 order precisely because it minimizes
unnecessary regulation on cable systems. The Free State Foundation filed reply comments in the proceeding that led to the
Commission's order. And blog posts were written in defense of the 2019 order in
July 2019, May 2019, and September 2018.
The Supreme Court should deny
Eugene's cert petition. Congress expressly prohibited the sorts of fees on
information services offered over cable systems that Eugene seeks to impose. And
the Sixth Circuit rightly upheld the FCC's rules doing just that.