On November 4, oral arguments were held before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the case of Molak v. FCC. The case involves a legal challenge to the Commission's October 2023 School Bus Wi-Fi Order. The Petitioners, represented by Mr. David A. Suska during oral arguments, claim that the agency lacks authority under Section 254 of the Communications Act to use E-Rate funds to subsidize Wi-Fi on school buses.
By a declaratory ruling passed on a 3-2 vote of the Commission's members, the agency is interpreting the law to effectively extend the Emergency Connectivity Fund (ECF) beyond its sunset date of June 2024. The ECF was a $58.2 billion subsidy program for subsidizing Wi-Fi hotspots and broadband services for school buses and off-campus connectivity. The program was authorized under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA) as a lockdown-era emergency measure. Section 7402 of the ARPA expressly authorized subsidies for supporting "eligible equipment" and advanced telecommunications and information services for use by students, school staff, and library goers "at locations that include locations other than the school" and "other than the library."
In our February 2024 Perspectives from FSF Scholars, "FCC's School Bus Wi-Fi Subsidy Lacks Statutory Support," Free State Foundation President Randolph May and I addressed legal problems with the School Bus Wi-Fi Order. Section 254 of the Communications Act is more limited than Section 7402 of the ARPA. Section 254(h)(1)(B) authorizes the Commission to provide subsidy support to telecommunications carriers for "services to elementary schools, secondary schools, and libraries for educational purposes." And Section 254(h)(2)(A) directs the Commission to adopt competitively neutral rules to enhance "access to advanced telecommunications and information services for all public nonprofit elementary and secondary school classrooms, health care providers, and libraries." In short, we concluded that the FCC overreached in subsidizing school bus Wi-Fi subsidies under Section 254 because buses are notschools, classrooms, or libraries – and schools are not telecommunications carriers.
Before the Fifth Circuit, Mr. Suska ably argued that the School Bus Wi-Fi Order exceeded the law in four ways: (1) by making subsidies available to anyone, not just telecommunications carriers; (2) by making subsidies available for any kind of service, not just telecommunications services; (3) by making subsidies available for equipment, which is not in the statute; and (4) by providing subsidies to schools instead of telecommunications carriers. In short,
On behalf of the FCC, Ms. Rachel Proctor May argued: "The word 'classroom' is best interpreted to include buses that have been outfitted with Wi-Fi so they can serve as rolling study halls." That type of elastic interpretation might have sufficed under the old "Chevron doctrine." But that is a decidedly strained and result-driven interpretation by the FCC, and one the agency cannot rely on for its authority now that the Supreme Court's decision in Loper-Bright v. Raimondo has overruled Chevron. Moreover, it goes against human experience to think that any non-microscopic amount of homework will take place on Wi-Fi-connected school buses. No claimed agency technical expertise about imagined homework on school buses ought to rescue the FCC from the overreach of its School Bus Wi-Fi Order.
A significant portion of the oral arguments before the court addressed threshold procedural issues regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies and standing. Yet if the Fifth Circuit rules on the merits, there is a strong likelihood that the court will vacate the FCC's School Bus Wi-Fi Order.
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