Roth's NTIA Takes Early Aim at Rate Regulation

On July 30, 2025, Arielle Roth officially assumed the role of Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, a position that includes serving as Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Days later, NTIA released updated Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) regarding the $42.45 billion Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) Program. Notably, the revised FAQs underscore a significant policy shift from the Biden Administration's approach, one that aligns with Congress's explicit prohibition against broadband rate regulation.

This latest version of the FAQs builds on the BEAD Restructuring Policy Notice (BEAD RPN) that was released in early June. The BEAD RPN made numerous substantive changes to the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) that the Biden Administration NTIA issued in May 2022, including several addressing the low-cost service option (LCSO) requirement for BEAD Program grant recipients.

Under the NOFO, NTIA imposed prescriptive price and service terms for the LCSO. These included effective mandates on the maximum monthly rate, restrictions that, in substance, amounted to prohibited rate regulation.

The RPN eliminated those requirements: "BEAD subgrantees must still comply with the statutory provision to offer at least one LCSO, but NTIA hereby prohibits [states] from explicitly or implicitly setting the LCSO rate a subgrantee must offer." The updated FAQ expounds upon this point:

The IIJA prohibits NTIA or the Assistant Secretary from engaging in rate regulation. Because the Assistant Secretary must approve the LCSO in the Final Proposal, the rate contained may not be the result of rate regulation. The RPN addressed this fundamental flaw in the BEAD NOFO. The RPN eliminated BEAD NOFO requirements dictating price and other terms for the required low-cost service option.

In addition, the FAQ notes that, "[p]er the RPN, states may not apply state laws to reimpose LCSO requirements removed by the RPN."

This, of course, is a sharp departure from the Biden Administration's deeply flawed approach. As I described in a February 2024 Perspectives from FSF Scholars, "Virginia Flags NTIA's Impermissible Pressure to Regulate Broadband Rates," NTIA sought to compel Virginia to "specify an exact price or formula" for the LCSO.

That demand directly conflicted with Section 60102(h)(5)(D) of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which states that "[n]othing in this title may be construed to authorize the Assistant Secretary or the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to regulate the rates charged for broadband service."

By making explicit that neither NTIA nor a state may dictate broadband rates, the RPN and the updated FAQs realign BEAD Program implementation with the letter of the law. In doing so, they empower grant recipients to develop sustainable offerings. They also foster competition, innovation, and continued private investment (to the tune of $2.2 trillion and counting).

Released in the first few days of Roth's tenure as NTIA Administrator, these updated FAQs are a welcome indicator that, going forward, the BEAD Program will hew far more closely to congressional intent.

A Revisionist History of the BEAD Program Ignores Congressional Intent

Today's Policyband (subscription required) included a useful pointed critique of a July 9 Washington Monthly article suggesting a clandestine plot by Republican lawmakers to sabotage from within the $42.45 billion Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) Program. But there is even more that can be said by way of rebuttal.

The extraneous, partisan policies layered on top of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) by the Biden NTIA were not the issue, authors Paul Glastris and Kainoa Lowman insist. Instead, they make the unsupported claim that "the complexity and delays of the BEAD program and the broader failure of Washington over many years to solve the digital divide is overwhelmingly the result of telecom monopolies whose economic and political power previous administrations unleashed."

Likening NTIA's Notice of Funding Opportunity to an "everything bagel," the piece nevertheless goes to great lengths to assure us that requirements not found in the IIJA – promoting policies relating to labor standards, climate threats, net neutrality, third-party (so-called "open") access, and so on – "were not major time sinks." The real impediment, they suggest, was "incumbents' goal of avoiding competition to their existing infrastructure." The truth, meanwhile, is that lawmakers appropriately took reasonable steps to prevent the use of federal subsidies to overbuild privately financed networks to prevent waste and encourage additional private investment.

In the IIJA, Congress, exercising its authority under Article I of the Constitution's Spending Clause, reached a relatively rare bipartisan compromise. That compromise sought to learn from the mistakes of the past – mistakes that the authors describe at length – and once and for all connect those remaining locations not yet served by privately constructed broadband Internet infrastructure.

According to USTA | The Broadband Association, providers have invested nearly $2.2 trillion in broadband infrastructure since 1996 – including $94.7 billion just in 2023. Largely because of that capital spending, the FCC reported in May that "110 million homes and small businesses (95 percent) have access to a terrestrial fixed service with speeds of 100 Mbps download and 20 Mbps upload (100/20) or greater."

What the authors willfully choose to ignore is that the stated goal of the IIJA was to subsidize the prohibitively high price tag to connect primarily rural locations still "unserved" – not to use taxpayer dollars to compete with these existing, privately funded networks, which of course would disincentivize future investment.

Accordingly, Congress in the IIJA defined "unserved" as without access to speeds of at least 25/3 Mbps and "underserved" as lacking access to speeds of at least 100/20 Mbps; designated the FCC's then-under-development National Broadband Map as the definitive source of location-specific service availability information; established a challenge process to verify that information; and enlisted state-level offices to determine how best to overcome the unique geographic, financial, and other factors encountered within their borders.

To be sure, in practice BEAD Program implementation has left much to be desired. To suggest, however, that measures agreed to by Congress to avoid the wasteful overbuilding of existing broadband infrastructure using taxpayer dollars somehow tell a "story … of how telecom monopolies are behind the failure of government to solve the digital divide" ignores both the substantial role played by Biden NTIA overreach and the well-documented – in the article itself, no less – mistakes of the past.

Instead of engaging with the IIJA's actual text and structure, the authors rely on a convenient – but wrong-headed – narrative to try to deflect accountability away from those truly responsible and onto those that have invested the trillions necessary to connect nearly every location in the U.S.

Reduce Multiple Government Agency Merger Reviews

On June 11, the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority reportedly issued an order approving the Verizon/Frontier merger. The approval is welcome news, insofar as it involves the clearing of a regulatory hurdle to the completion of a pro-competition, pro-consumer transaction. As explained in a blog post from last month, the FCC approved the Verizon/Frontier on May 16. In its order, the FCC found that there are no potential transaction-related public interest harms and that there are some likely public interest benefits from the transaction. Verizon's and Frontier's wireline services operate in different geographic territories, meaning consumers do not lose a choice of providers as a result of the merger. Moreover, Verizon is more likely to invest in and improve service in Frontier territories than Frontier would absent the merger. Verizon's acquisition of Frontier means that fiber will reach more Americans – sooner.

 

Even with the approval by Connecticut regulators, the Verizon/Frontier merger is reportedly subject to pending reviews by state regulators in Pennsylvania and California. This raises the process issue of whether overlapping reviews of proposed mergers by state regulators are likely to provide added public benefits or more likely to result in extra costs and delays due to redundant reviews. This is not a new issue; it was the subject of my December 2010 Perspectives from FSF Scholars, "Multiple Government Regulatory Reviews Burden Telecom Mergers with Too Many Conditions." Therein, I discuss the problem of compounding process costs and regulatory conditions that can result from redundant merger reviews. 

 

One approach for a more efficient, streamlined process for mergers involving interstate communications service providers is to enable a sole federal agency review process in which state regulators are encouraged to provide input regarding state-specific concerns. 

 

Also, the FCC could adopt rules or issue a declaratory order setting forth limits on state regulatory conditions for merger approval as well as limits on state-level merger review process shotclocks. Actions by state regulators that transgress those limits and conflict with federal law would be subject to federal preemption. Certainly, this approach is viable in the interstate wireless communications services context, as merger review by state public utility commissions effectively constitutes state-level restrictions on market entry contrary to Section 332(c)(3) of the Communications Act. 

 

Hopefully, Pennsylvania and California will promptly conclude their reviews of Verizon/Frontier and allow fiber broadband to timely deploy to more Americans. 

GAO Flags Broadband Funding Coordination Concerns

Last month, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on the state of federal broadband funding interagency coordination. Not for the first time, it flagged breakdowns in process that could lead to duplication, waste, fraud, and abuse.

Publicly released on April 28, "Broadband Programs: Agencies Need to Further Improve Their Data Quality and Coordination Efforts," identifies two concerns:

1. The FCC's failure to evaluate and document the accuracy of the service availability data underlying its National Broadband Map, which "adds both to the risk that agencies leveraging these data cannot effectively target funding to areas that lack high-speed internet and to users' existing concerns about the data's reliability."
   
   
2. The need for the FCC, NTIA, and the Departments of Agriculture and Treasury to define with sufficient clarity their coordination processes to "better position the agencies to sustain their collaboration, manage fragmented federal broadband efforts, and ensure that the considerable federal broadband funding is spent efficiently and effectively."

Regarding the National Broadband Map, the Report states that:

FCC officials described its processes for data validations, verifications, audits, and enforcement referrals as a new workstream that continues to be informed by fresh rounds of data, citing this as the reason why FCC had not yet formally evaluated or finalized formal operating procedures for these processes. However, without evaluating the effectiveness of its validations, verifications, audits, and referrals processes, FCC cannot know the extent to which these processes are sufficient to ensure the accuracy of the data in the National Broadband Map.

With respect to interagency coordination, the Report identifies three shortcomings: (1) no clear shared definition as to what the "covered data" that the agencies have agreed to share actually entails; (2) delays in the submission of data to be included in the FCC's Broadband Funding Map, a separate map that I described in a May 2023 Perspectives from FSF Scholars; and (3) the fact that "officials … have not established a formal process to de-duplicate their funding prior to making decisions about projects to fund."

To address these concerns, the Report presents 14 recommendations for executive action.

As you may recall, the GAO assessed broadband funding interagency coordination efforts once before, in May 2022. As I noted in a contemporaneous post to the Free State Foundation's blog, "Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide" identified "at least 133 funding programs that could support increased broadband access" under the purview of 15 different agencies and warned that "[t]his patchwork of programs could lead to wasteful duplication of funding and effort."

FCC Approves Verizon/Frontier Merger

Today, May 16, the FCC approved the Verizon/Frontier merger. The Commission's order approving the transaction stated: "Overall, we find that there are no potential transaction-related public interest harms and that there are some likely publicinterest benefits from this Transaction." As the agency's order explained: "[W]e conclude that Verizon is more likely to invest in and improve service quality in the Transaction market areas than Frontier would absent the Transaction. While the record indicates that Frontier has deployed fiber, no commenter disputes that it does not have funding in place for enhanced investment and additional fiber buildouts." The FCC's approval of Verizon's acquisition of Frontier means that fiber will reach more Americans – sooner.

 In an April 2 blog post, I noted that objections raised by public commenters in the Verizon/Frontier proceeding regarding IP interconnection, transitioning from legacy networks technologies to newer technologies failed to identify actual or potential harms arising from the transaction. Thus, I wrote that the Commission should not consider those matters as grounds for withholding approval of the transaction. The FCC essentially agreed with this view. The Commission's order characterized those same matters as not transaction-specific.

Credit is due to Chairman Brendan Carr and to staff in the Commission's bureaus who were involved in the review proceeding and prepared the Verizon/Frontier Order. Congratulations also are due to Verizon and Frontier. Hopefully, the consummation of the merger will accelerate fiber broadband deployment to Americans across the country. 

Also, the order stated the Commission accepts Verizon's commitment to reform its internal practices, and that the agency "expect[s] that these changes will prevent DEI discrimination in the post-transaction company, as consistent with the law and the public interest."

On the merits, approval of Verizon/Frontier is an easy call. Even so, the FCC's decision was right – and it was reached without excessive complications or undue delays. The Commission completed its review of Verizon/Frontier on day 189, just 9 days above the agency's informal shot clock.